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Civil Law Pulsations 
Along the Latin American Periphery 
Ángel R. Oquendo* 
The civil law system shows its true face as it travels from the 
Continental European core to the Latin American periphery. 
Many of the principal institutions have found a home and 
thrived in the new and radically different environment. One 
can best study them there by contemplating how they have 
preserved some of their most basic features despite having 
transformed themselves into something else. 
The notion of the civil law tradition and that of codification 
have themselves undergone this dialectic of transformation 
and preservation. So have the traditional approach to con-
tractual interpretation and to third-party agreements and 
the common proscriptions on retroactivity and punitive dam-
ages. In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe, 
the intent of the parties typically takes precedence over the 
text of the contract and an agreement normally may benefit 
a third party despite the general restriction on extra-party 
effects. Similarly, a relatively strict ban on the retroactive 
application of statutes and on the imposition of punitive 
damages prevails on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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The civil law system shows its true face in Latin America. Cer-
tainly, it sees its blurry contours grow in blurriness as it travels from 
the Continental European core to the Latin American periphery. 
Nevertheless, many of the principal institutions have found a home 
and thrived in the new and radically different environment. In fact, 
one can best study them, in their modern globalized form, there, by 
contemplating how they have preserved their most basic features de-
spite having transformed themselves into something else. 
To a great extent, this legal development mirrors its linguistic 
counterpart. The Spanish and Portuguese languages underwent a 
similarly dramatic transformation upon crossing the Atlantic Ocean. 
As currently internationalized, they exist most clearly and call for 
examination as they have developed in the New World. 
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Parts II and III will, respectively, explore the notion of the civil 
law tradition and that of codification in Continental Europe and, par-
ticularly, in Latin America. Part IV will, in turn, analyze the widely 
shared approach to contractual interpretation generally and to third-
party agreements specifically. Finally, Part V will shift from pre-
scriptions to proscriptions, in particular to those on retroactivity and 
punitive damages. Predictably, Part VI will close with a couple con-
cluding thoughts. 
II. THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 
The civil law tradition developed in Continental Europe and 
took root all over the world, principally as a result of European co-
lonialism. Iberian American countries partake in this heritage be-
cause they once belonged to the Spanish and Portuguese empires. 
The law of Spain and Portugal emerged on the Iberian Peninsula, 
expanded into Latin America, and mostly displaced indigenous legal 
cultures.1 
The term “civil law tradition” underscores the centrality of civil 
law. Civil law, as a subcategory of private law, generally regulates 
relationships between individuals or private entities. It differs fun-
damentally from public law, which governs disputes involving the 
government. However, civil law does not exhaust the category of 
private law because it refers only to those private matters that con-
cern the civil code. It therefore includes areas such as torts, con-
tracts, property, family, and successions, but ordinarily excludes 
commercial, corporate, traffic, labor, and insurance matters.2 The 
civil code, accordingly, defines the boundaries of civil law.3 
In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe, civil law 
reigns supreme. It commands respect, sometimes reverence. Specif-
ically, it serves as a model for other areas, like constitutional, ad-
ministrative, and criminal law. Furthermore, it represents a common 
language for all lawyers, regardless of their specialization. In fact, it 
                                                                                                             
 1 See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, MICHAEL W. GORDON, CHRISTOPHER 
OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL (1982); JOHN H. 
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1985). 
 2 See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 45; MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 6-7. 
 3 See generally Part III infra. 
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occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of constitutional law 
in the United States.4 
The civil law tradition should not be approached rigidly. It is by 
no means fixed or uniform, let alone sacred. It encompasses a vari-
ety of constantly evolving legal regimes, which frequently differ in 
their basic structure, as well as in their details. These systems of law 
simply share what Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein calls, 
more broadly, a “family resemblance.”5 In other words, they do not 
have a common essence, but, rather, interrelate with each other in a 
complex manner. They present “a complicated network of similari-
ties overlapping and crosscutting at all levels: general and specific.”6 
For instance, a particular jurisdiction may resemble others in that 
it officially denies precedential force to decisions stemming from 
the judiciary, yet it may diverge from them to the extent that it pro-
vides specialized courts for constitutional and administrative mat-
ters. Further, it may share this latter trait with another group, some 
of whose members may recognize judicial precedents. In fact, a few 
legal orders within the tradition do not even codify their civil law 
and many of the rest conceive of their respective codes so differently 
that one can hardly speak of a clear convergence.7 
Nonetheless, the various systems of law resemble each other like 
family members, who share certain features in a similar way. The 
entire civil law tradition has a characteristic style or flavor, which 
reflects the mentioned interconnections. This commonality, which 
becomes more evident through a comparison with Anglo-American 
                                                                                                             
 4 See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 46; MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 5 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN § 67 (1967) 
(“Familienähnlichkeiten.”) Wittgenstein explains that the members of a family do 
not all share a particular characteristic or group of characteristics. Some resemble 
others in the smile, others in the personality, and still others in the tone of voice. 
They are thus all interrelated without converging on a single feature, “for the var-
ious resemblances between the members of a family: build, facial features, eye 
color, gait, temperament, etc., etc., overlap and intercross . . . .” Id. (“denn so 
übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den 
Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, 
Temperament, etc., etc.”). 
 6 Id. § 66 (“ein kompliziertes Netz von Ähnlichkeiten, die einander 
übergreifen und kreuzen. Ähnlichkeiten im Großen und Kleinen.”). 
 7 See MERRYMAN, supra note 1, at 26. 
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law, derives from an intense process of cross-fertilization, as well as 
from a shared history.8 
An understanding of how the tradition as a whole hangs to-
gether, along with a requisite antecedent examination of the histori-
cal origins and subsequent development, is an invaluable asset in the 
process of making sense of the underlying regimes. Taking this 
overarching perspective is especially useful for people trained under 
a different legal culture, such as the common law. It enables them to 
perceive a particular civil law jurisdiction’s institutions not as a ran-
dom assortment, but, rather, as a relatively coherent set. Through 
this approach, Anglo-American lawyers may discern in Brazil’s 
codification, managerial adjudication, and abstract judicial review 
the country’s civil law heritage, instead of a quaint praxis. 
One must proceed with caution when making generalizations, 
precisely because of the noted variability within the civil law. An 
even higher degree of circumspection is in order when considering 
Latin American legal systems. The center of gravity of the civil law 
tradition lies in Europe, particularly in Germany and France.9 Latin 
American law has evolved on the periphery, under very particular 
conditions of economic underdevelopment, fierce social conflict, 
and heavy U.S. influence. Consequently, it often operates at a dis-
tance from the European paradigm. 
Moreover, Latin America encompasses 20 distinct jurisdictions, 
which operate independently of each other, even though they share 
a transnational legal legacy.10 The main challenge in grasping the 
                                                                                                             
 8 See generally Part III infra. 
 9 See GLENDON et al., supra note 1, at 29 (The French Civil Code of 1804 
and the German Civil Code of 1896 “have had such widespread and lasting influ-
ence that they and their accompanying ideologies can be said to have become part 
of the contemporary civil law tradition.”). 
 10 See Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, Notas para una historia social del derecho en 
América Latina: La relación de las prácticas y los principios jurídicos, 52 REV. 
COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS P.R. 1 (1991) (“La primera y más banal observación es 
que no existe un sistema jurídico latinoamericano sino veinte estados-naciones, 
cada uno con su propio sistema . . . .En sentido opuesto puede hacerse también la 
observación corriente de la relativa unidad cultural de la zona.”) (“Obviously, no 
single, monolithic Latin American legal order exists as such. Each one of the 
twenty nation-states has its own system . . . .Nonetheless, the cultural unity of the 
entire territory is self-evident.”). 
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law of the region is to perceive the broad parallels without neglect-
ing the particularities. Of course, the recognition of a unified tradi-
tion ineluctably colors the interpretation of each of the individual 
legal orders. 
At most, the civil law provides a context for the study of Latin 
American law. References to that tradition may launch the discus-
sion, but they certainly should not bring it to an end. They simply 
prepare the way for a thorough analysis of the peculiarities of the 
particular legal systems that coexist throughout the Continent. 
III. CODIFICATION 
By and large, Latin American countries share a civil law with 
each other and with their Continental European counterparts. The 
various national civil codes reflect this commonality, as well as sub-
stantial differences. They converge on their origins and aims, but 
diverge on their details.11 
In Latin America, as well as in Continental Europe, codification 
ensued almost as a logical consequence of legal nationalization. In-
sofar as the nation-state intended to assert national law, it tended to 
do so systematically. In other words, it typically put forth a code that 
served as the sole source of law. The nationalized polity thus de-
cided directly and explicitly what legal norms to apply within its 
jurisdiction. Of course, it could still hold on to those aspects of the 
European common law that it wanted to enforce in its domain.12 
As the codification process unfolded, Latin American countries 
were on their way out of the colonial fold. By 1822, most of them 
had achieved independence.13 Latin America therefore took the road 
to codification on its own. In fact, it did so earlier and more deci-
sively than the former colonial powers.14 
                                                                                                             
 11 See generally Part II supra. 
 12 See generally Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Histori-
cal Interpretation, 46 LA. L. REV. 241, 248 (1985); KENNETH L. KARST & KEITH 
S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 42-43 (1975). 
 13 See generally KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 44. 
 14 See generally Bernardino Bravo Lira, Codificación Civil en Ibero-américa 
y en la Península Ibérica (1827-1917): Derecho Nacional y Europeización, en 
FUENTES IDEOLÓGICAS Y NORMATIVAS DE LA CODIFICACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA 
(Abelardo Levaggi coord., 1992). 
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After independence, the official legal unity of Latin America 
came to an end. The different territories broke off from the over-
arching imperial realm of law and became separate jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, the pre-existing substantive legal cohesion largely en-
dured.15 
The new national regimes preserved Spanish and Portuguese pri-
vate law, respectively, until they completed the protracted process 
of codification. They engaged in “intensive comparative study of 
texts”16 in order to produce their national codes. Each of these soci-
eties paid attention broadly to all available European legislation, but 
especially to Latin American law. It primarily turned to its neigh-
bors’ efforts because of the geographical, cultural, linguistic, and 
legal proximity.17 
In fact, some countries adopted verbatim codes prepared else-
where in the region. For instance, Colombia, Panama, El Salvador, 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Honduras enacted the Chilean 
Code of 1857, written mostly by the Venezuelan Andrés Bello. 
Other nations drew heavily from it. This most influential codifica-
tion effort constitutes a milestone within the entire civil law tradition 
and has had enormous influence throughout Latin America.18 
Civil Code drafters normally seek to achieve two goals. First, 
they attempt to rationalize the law.19 Second, they seek to proclaim 
the will of the people as represented by elected officials and ration-
ally elaborated by the drafting committee.20 These two objectives 
lead to certain expectations regarding adjudication. For instance, 
                                                                                                             
 15 See generally id. 
 16 John Merryman coined this expression in John H. Merryman, Comparative 
Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 773 (1998). 
 17 See generally Bravo Lira, supra note 14; KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, 
at 45-47. 
 18 See generally Bravo Lira, supra note 14. 
 19 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 225, 234-238 (1998); KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 45. 
 20 See Stein, supra note 12, at 252 (“It was the jurists who . . . prepared the 
ground for the codification movement of the eighteenth century. But that move-
ment was, in part at least, inspired by the layman’s suspicion both of jurists and 
of judges and by a popular desire to weaken the power of both groups.”). 
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courts must regard and interpret the code as a coherent and inte-
grated whole.21 More importantly, they must strictly adhere to this 
democratically enacted law when deciding concrete cases. 
To a considerable degree, Latin American codes embrace the 
French model on the relationship between legislation and adjudica-
tion.22 Many of them incorporate an equivalent not only of French 
Article 4, which holds the judge liable for refusing to adjudicate be-
cause of the law’s silence, obscurity or insufficiency,23 but also of 
Article 5, which prohibits generally binding judicial holdings.24 
Chile’s Code, like others throughout Latin America, insists on the 
preeminence of statutes’ clear import over any possible construal of 
their underlying purpose: “When a law’s meaning is clear, its literal 
import shall not be disregarded under the pretext of consulting its 
spirit.”25 
While the process of codification begins with similar premises 
everywhere, the specific form it takes ineluctably varies from one 
country to the next. Moreover, the historical school, which German 
scholar Friedrich Karl von Savigny most prominently defended, 
contributed a novel notion. It proposed that the law should reflect 
                                                                                                             
 21 See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), Art. 2 (“La ley debe ser interpretada te-
niendo en cuenta sus palabras, sus finalidades, las leyes análogas, las disposicio-
nes que surgen de los tratados sobre derechos humanos, los principios y los valo-
res jurídicos, de modo coherente con todo el ordenamiento.”) (“The law shall be 
interpreted taking into account its words, its aims, analogous laws, the provisions 
of human rights treaties, and legal principles and values, in coherence with the 
order as a whole.”). 
 22 See generally KARST & ROSENN, supra note 12, at 45-47; Matthew C. Mir-
row, Borrowing Private Law in Latin America: Andrés Bello’s Use of the Code 
Napoléon in Drafting the Chilean Civil Code, 61 LA. L. REV. 291, 308 (2001). 
 23 Compare CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 4 with CD. CIV. (Arg.) (1871), art. 15; 
CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1884), art. 4; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18; CD. CIV. FED. 
(Mex.) (1928), art. 18; CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 8; CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 
7; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 6; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 15. 
 24 Compare CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 5 with CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 3; 
CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1873), arts. 17 & 25; CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1826), art. 5; CD. CIV. 
(Ecuad.) (2005), art. 3; CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 4; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), 
art. 12. 
 25 CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 19. See also CD. CIV. (COLOM.) (1873), art. 
27; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(1a); CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 17; CD. 
CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 14; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), arts. 17; CD. CIV. (Venez.) 
(1982), art. 4. 
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the spirit of a particular people.26 In Latin America, this idea had 
substantial influence, especially on Andrés Bello.27 
In any event, Latin American codes began falling out of date 
from their inception. They intensely continued down this path from 
the twentieth century on. In response, legislatures have enacted 
many specialized statutes in areas that have gained prominence 
since codification, such as insurance, products liability, labor law, 
corporations, etc. In the absence of legislative action, courts have 
had to update the code when these matters have arisen in concrete 
cases. Finally, legal scholars have heavily expounded the existing 
provisions in an attempt to offer guidance for the judiciary, as well 
as for lawmakers.28 
For example, civil codes in Latin America, as in France and else-
where, have required considerable updating in light of their anti-
quated, sexist view of the role of women in the family and in society. 
Literally following the original French Article 213, Article 128 of 
the Uruguayan Civil Code declares, for instance, that “the husband 
shall protect the wife and the wife shall obey him.”29 The Uruguayan 
legislature implicitly derogated this provision with the 1946 
Women’s Civil Capacity Act.30 
Similarly, Andrés Bello’s Civil Code for Chile embraces the in-
itial French position by banning paternity suits. In 1998, the Chilean 
Congress introduced Article 195, expressly allowing judicial inquir-
ies into filiation.31 Nonetheless, Chile’s Supreme Court appears to 
                                                                                                             
 26 See generally FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT 
FÜR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (2012). Savigny himself, how-
ever, opposed the process of codification in Germany. See Harold J. Berman & 
Charles J. Reid, Jr., Roman Law in Europe and the Jus Commune: A Historical 
Overview with Emphasis on the New Legal Science of the Sixteenth Century , 20 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 28 (“Savigny, the great founder of the historical 
school, opposed the codification of German civil law in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, his opposition was based in part on the argument that in the German Länder 
the time was not ripe for such a codification; in the later nineteenth century his 
followers were among the leaders of the movement that produced the German 
Civil Code.”). 
 27 See generally Mirrow, supra note 22, at 308. 
 28 See generally John H. Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and the 
German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1865, 1868-1870 (1988). 
 29 Cd. Civ. (Uru.) (1868), art. 128. 
 30 L. 10783 (Uru.) (1946), art. 1. 
 31 L. 19585 (Chile) (1998), art. 195. 
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have undermined the legislative intent of that provision by requiring 
extensive documentary support for that kind of complaint.32 On a 
more positive note, the same tribunal has discretely moved away 
from the codified presumption that, upon separation, the mother 
must “take personal charge of the children’s care.”33 
Lawmakers, judges, and scholars have thus preserved the Code 
from desuetude. As a result, however, they have increasingly led 
people to look elsewhere for solutions to legal problems. In their 
effort to maintain its relevance, these actors have, ultimately and 
paradoxically, rendered the document ever more irrelevant.34 
Throughout the region, legislative microsystems have cropped 
up and judicial as well as administrative institutions have taken over 
entire areas of law.35 In the twentieth and even twenty-first centu-
ries, moreover, Latin American lawmakers have often distanced 
themselves from their French or German counterparts by commis-
sioning completely new, ideologically updated codes.36 Unfortu-
nately, they have seldom provided guidance on how codification 
might advance the social values and solidarity ideals of the welfare 
state. Moreover, they have never made clear how a code could pos-
sibly regulate legal spheres that require permanent renewal and re-
vision. 
The previously described process of decodification has taken 
place in a time in which the common law world has produced stat-
utes for considerable portions of its private law. Consequently, the 
contrast between the two western legal traditions no longer assumes 
the form of a simple opposition between codified and judge-made 
law. Both legal universes now overlap considerably on the perva-
siveness of statutory law.37 
                                                                                                             
 32 See Báez Sierra v. Dinamarca Henríquez, Rol No. 461-01 (Supr. Ct.) 
(Chile) (2002); Espinoza González v. Álvarez Díaz, Rol No. 2518-01 (Supr. Ct.) 
(Chile) (2002). 
 33 CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 225. See In Re Carracedo Alvarado, Rol No. 
1620-01 (Supr. Ct.) (Chile) (2001). 
 34 See generally Merryman, supra note 28, at 1868-1870. 
 35 See generally id. 
 36 See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005); CD. CIV. 
(Braz.) (2003). 
 37 See generally Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and 
Case Law in the Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 667-670 
(1998). 
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The fact that court opinions have gained prominence has brought 
the civil law realm closer to its common law counterpart. Of course, 
even the highest court’s judicial decisions are not technically equiv-
alent to case law. They may constitute a functional equivalent, how-
ever, inasmuch as they command attention and are broadly followed 
throughout the jurisdiction.38 
To a significant extent, this convergence tendency responds to 
internal causes within each system. Intellectual as well as economic 
globalization has also played a role in this development. It has led 
the two legal communities to pay more attention to each other and 
to borrow not only specific concepts but also general approaches 
from each other.39 
Civil, commercial, and procedural codes in Latin America have 
borne the imprint of the civil law tradition from the nineteenth cen-
tury onward. They have faced the same problems of obsolescence 
and irrelevance as their continental European counterparts.40 None-
theless, Latin American codes have run into special difficulties due 
to the generalized institutional weakness and social injustice in the 
region.41 They have therefore often failed to fulfill their mission or 
deliver on their promise. These fundamental differences notwith-
standing, a considerable degree of transatlantic coherence has sur-
vived.42 
IV. CONTRACTUAL INTENT AND THIRD-PARTY AGREEMENTS 
PERUVIAN AND LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 
A. Overview 
This Part will analyze how, in Peru and other civil law jurisdic-
tions, particularly within Latin America, the intent of the contracting 
parties bears upon the interpretation of a contract, in relation to the 
text. It will also consider whether third party agreements call for the 
application of the same exegetical principles. The discussion will 
conclude that they generally do and that they specifically escape the 
                                                                                                             
 38 See generally id. 
 39 See generally id. 
 40 See generally Merryman, supra note 28, at 1868-1870. 
 41 See generally Pérez Perdomo, supra note 10. 
 42 See, e.g., Parts IV & V infra. 
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restriction on contractual extra-party effects, creating an enforceable 
right for the beneficiary. In these areas, the civil law tradition shows 
considerable cohesion and the code continues to play a central role. 
B. Intent of the Contractual Parties 
At least since the nineteenth century, the civil law tradition has, 
more openly than its common law counterpart, invited courts to fo-
cus on the intent of the parties over and above the ultimately exe-
cuted contractual text. Of course, throughout the twentieth century, 
it moved toward imposing social considerations to trump the intent 
of the parties. For example, Continental European and Latin Amer-
ican jurisdictions started disallowing an oppressive labor contract, 
even if the signatories had clearly agreed to it.43 Nonetheless, if no 
such public interest restriction applies, what the parties intend car-
ries the day, sometimes even over what they write in. 
Latin American civil codes, true to their civil law roots, ordinar-
ily mandate reading a contract through the parties’ joint intent. They 
treat the underlying written instrument as both primary evidence of 
and subservient to the latter. The Civil Code of Paraguay, providing 
a stark case in point and essentially echoing its French counterpart, 
declares: “When interpreting a contract, one should inquire into the 
common intention of the parties rather than limit oneself to the lit-
eral sense of the words.”44 Bolivian law formulates this principle 
similarly.45 The Brazilian legal system, inspired by the German 
                                                                                                             
 43 See, e.g., L. FED. TBJO. (Mexico) (1970), art. 5 (“ . . . no producirá efecto 
legal, . . . , sea escrita o verbal, la estipulación que establezca . . . (II) Una jornada 
mayor que la permitida por esta Ley; . . . (V) Un salario inferior al mínimo; . . . “) 
(“ . . . agreements, whether written or oral, establishing the following shall have 
no legal effect . . . : (II) a workday longer than this Act allows; . . . (V) a salary 
lower than the minimum wage . . . .”). 
 44 CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 708 (“Al interpretarse el contrato se deberá 
indagar cuál ha sido la intención común de parte y no limitarse al sentido literal 
de las palabras.”). See also CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 1156 (“On doit dans les 
conventions rechercher quelle a été la commune intention des parties contrac-
tantes, plutôt que de s’arrêter au sens littéral des termes.”) (“One should inquire 
into the common intention of the parties to a contract rather than limit oneself to 
the literal sense of the words.”). 
 45 See CD. CIV. (Bol.) (1976), art. 510 (“En la interpretación de los contratos 
se debe averiguar cuál ha sido la intención común de las partes y no limitarse al 
sentido literal de las palabras.”) (“When interpreting a contract, one should find 
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model, deploys practically identical language when discussing “dec-
larations of intent,” which constitute a key element in contractual 
exegesis.46 
Chile’s Civil Code, for its part, takes this overall approach most 
typically: “If clearly known, the intention of the contracting parties 
shall carry more weight than the contract’s literal words.”47 Colom-
bia, Ecuador, and El Salvador each use the same phrasing,48 while 
many other nations rely on an equivalent formulation: “If the terms 
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt about the intention of its 
parties, one should focus on the literal sense of its clauses. If the 
words appear to run counter to the parties’ clear intention, the latter 
shall take precedence over the former.”49 Accordingly, a tribunal in 
any of these jurisdictions should favor an interpretation that the par-
ties manifestly intended over what the contract expresses. 
The main provision of the Peruvian Civil Code on this matter, 
Article 1361, calls for construction from a similar standpoint: “One 
should presume the terms contained in the contract to coincide with 
the intent of the parties. Whoever denies such coincidence shall bear 
the burden of proof.”50 In other words, judges should concentrate on 
                                                                                                             
out the common intention of the parties rather than limit oneself to the literal 
meaning of the words.”). 
 46 CD. CIV. (Braz.) (2003), art. 112 (“Nas declarações de vontade se atenderá 
mais à intenção nelas consubstanciada do que ao sentido literal da linguagem.”) 
(“Regarding declarations of intent, one should attend more to the intent embodied 
in them than to the literal sense of the words.”). See also BGB (Germany) (1900), 
Art.133 (“Bei der Auslegung einer Willenserklärung ist der wirkliche Wille zu 
erforschen und nicht an dem buchstäblichen Sinne des Ausdrucks zu haften.”) 
(“In interpreting a declaration of intent, one should inquire into the actual intent 
rather than into the literal meaning of the words.”). 
 47 CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), art. 1560 (“Conocida claramente la intención de 
los contratantes, debe estarse a ella más que a lo literal de las palabras.”). 
 48 See CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 1618; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 
1576; CD. CIV. (El. Salv.) (1859), art. 1431. 
 49 See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 1576; CD. CIV. (Mex., D.F.) (1928), 
art. 1851; CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 2496; CD. CIV. (Pan.) (1961), art. 1132; 
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1939), art. 1233 (“Si los términos de un contrato son claros y no 
dejan duda sobre la intención de los contratantes, se estará al sentido literal de sus 
cláusulas. Si las palabras parecieren contrarias a la intención evidente de los con-
tratantes, prevalecerá ésta sobre aquéllas.”). 
 50 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1361 (“Se presume que la declaración expre-
sada en el contrato responde a la voluntad común de las partes y quien niegue esa 
coincidencia debe probarla.”). 
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the aim of the parties and treat the ultimately undersigned document 
as the principal evidentiary means. Nonetheless, they should privi-
lege the intention over the contractual text in the face of a demon-
strable divergence. 
Other relevant parts of Peru’s Civil Code support this reading. 
Article 1356, for instance, bears the heading “Primacy of the Intent 
of the Contracting Parties” and provides that: “Except when manda-
tory, legal rules on contracts are subject to the intent of the par-
ties.”51 Likewise, Articles 1362 and 1352 establish, respectively, 
that: “Contracts shall be negotiated, executed, and complied with, in 
accordance with good faith and the common intent of the parties”52 
and generally “come about simply through the consent of the par-
ties . . . .”53 
Consequently, courts throughout Latin America, including Peru, 
must construe a contract to entail A if they find that the parties ex-
pected this entailment. They must do so whether the text states A or 
B and, naturally, when it permits either construction. Coincidentally, 
the legal order in these countries does not impose any special re-
strictions, such as the common law “parol evidence rule,”54 on the 
submission of proof in the inquiry into the aim of the parties. 
A Paraguayan and a Chilean adjudicator, for example, would 
each refer to A, in turn, as (1) the “common intention of the parties” 
into which one should inquire “rather than limit oneself to the literal 
sense of the words” and (2) the clear “intention of the contracting 
parties” that carries “more weight than the contract’s literal words.” 
Analogously, a Peruvian litigant who proves A to be “the intent of 
                                                                                                             
 51 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1356 (“Primacía de la voluntad de contratan-
tes”; “Las disposiciones de la ley sobre contratos son supletorias de la voluntad 
de las partes, salvo que sean imperativas.”). 
 52 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1362 (“Los contratos deben negociarse, cele-
brarse y ejecutarse según las reglas de la buena fe y común intención de las par-
tes.”). 
 53 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1352 (“Los contratos se perfeccionan por el 
consentimiento de las partes . . . .”). 
 54 See Arthur Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 603 (1944) 
(“When two parties have made a contract and have expressed it in a writing to 
which they have both assented as the complete and accurate integration of that 
contract, evidence, whether parol or otherwise, of antecedent understandings and 
negotiations will not be admitted for the purpose of varying or contradicting the 
writing.”). 
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the parties” overcomes any presumption in favor of “the terms con-
tained in the contract.” He or she may thereby reinforce the docu-
ment in writing if convergent, clarify it if ambiguous, or trump it if 
divergent. 
In sum, Latin American law, as part of its civil law heritage, 
usually requires reading a contract on the basis of the parties’ joint 
intention. It commands enforcing the latter, when plainly ascertain-
able, even if at odds with the eventually executed instrument. Along 
parallel lines, Peru’s Civil Code necessitates disregarding the con-
tractual wording upon proof of a contrary intent. Throughout the re-
gion, one must interpret a contract to mean A if one ascertains that 
the parties intended this meaning. One must do so whether the text 
says A or B and, of course, when it allows either interpretation. 
C. Third-Party Contracts 
In consequence, the judiciary in Latin America, as in the civil 
law tradition as a whole, should normally base itself on the intent of 
the parties in order to decide whom the contract benefits or entitles 
and how or to what exactly. It should first turn to the text for guid-
ance, but may have to look beyond to discover what precisely the 
parties intended. If they meant to confer a benefit or a right to an-
other person in a certain manner, they should have their way, inde-
pendently of whether the ensuing document affirms so or not. Latin 
American legal systems do not exempt such agreements from the 
core precepts of contractual interpretation, let alone advance alter-
native exegetical fundaments. 
The so-called principle of “contractual relativity,”55 which often 
prevails in the civil law world and which establishes that “contracts 
only obligate and bind the parties,”56 should not alter the analysis. It 
merely constitutes a default norm with numerous exceptions.57 In 
                                                                                                             
 55 See, e.g., PILAR JIMÉNEZ BLANCO, EL CONTRATO INTERNACIONAL A FAVOR 
DE TERCERO 33 (Imprenta Universitaria: Santiago de Compostela, Spain) (2002) 
(“relatividad contractual”). 
 56 Id. (“los contratos sólo obligan y vinculan a las partes del mismo”). 
 57 See Aníbal Torres Vásquez, Contrato en favor de tercero, at 14 (originally 
published as ANÍBAL TORRES VÁSQUEZ, Ch. IX (Contrato en favor de tercero), 
Vol. II, TEORÍA GENERAL DEL CONTRATO (Instituto Pacífico: Lima) (2012)) (avai-
lable at http://www.etorresvasquez.com.pe/pdf/CONTRATO-EN-FAVOR-DE-
TERCER.pdf) (last visited on 9/18/2016) (“Sin embargo, el principio de la relati-
vidad del contrato no es absoluto, porque el ordenamiento jurídico permite que el 
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fact, many of the very laws that espouse the concept also unequivo-
cally legitimate third party accords. 
For instance, Argentina’s 2016 Civil Code embraces, in its Ar-
ticle 1021, this “General Rule”: “A contract generates effects only 
among the contracting parties; not with respect to third parties, ex-
cept as provided by law.”58 To avoid any misunderstanding, it adds 
the following, in its Article 1022, on “Third Parties”: “A contract 
does not give rise to obligations on the part of third parties. Moreo-
ver, third parties have no right to invoke it to impose obligations not 
agreed upon on the contracting parties, except as provided by law.”59 
Nonetheless, the same piece of legislation subsequently sanc-
tions an “agreement in favor of a third party,” under its Article 1027, 
in these terms: “If a contract contains an agreement in favor of a 
third party . . . , the promisor thereby grants that person the corre-
sponding rights or benefits as agreed with the promisee . . . .With 
his acceptance, the third party acquires the rights and privileges re-
sulting from the agreement in his favor.”60 Hence, the Argentine 
Civil Code does not defer the specification of exceptional cases to 
other enactments, but, rather, starts undertaking the task itself. 
                                                                                                             
contrato pueda producir sus efectos favorables en cabeza de un tercero; así sucede 
cuando uno de los contratantes tiene interés en obtener que la otra parte ejecute 
su prestación ante un tercero beneficiario, atribuyéndole a este último el derecho 
de exigirla.”) (“Nonetheless, the principle of contractual relativity is not absolute. 
The law allows a contract to produce effects favorable to a third party. For in-
stance, one of the contracting parties may have an interest in his counterparty per-
forming an action for the benefit of a third party beneficiary. He thus grants the 
latter the right to enforce the agreement”). See also id. at 55. 
 58 CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 1021 (“Regla general: El contrato sólo tiene 
efecto entre las partes contratantes; no lo tiene con respecto a terceros, excepto en 
los casos previstos por la ley.”). 
 59 Id. art. 1022 (“Situación de los terceros: El contrato no hace surgir obliga-
ciones a cargo de terceros, ni los terceros tienen derecho a invocarlo para hacer 
recaer sobre las partes obligaciones que éstas no han convenido, excepto disposi-
ción legal.”). 
 60 Id. art. 1027 (“Estipulación a favor de tercero: Si el contrato contiene una 
estipulación a favor de un tercero beneficiario, determinado o determinable, el 
promitente le confiere los derechos o facultades resultantes de lo que ha conve-
nido con el estipulante . . . .El tercero aceptante obtiene directamente los derechos 
y las facultades resultantes de la estipulación a su favor.”). 
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The civil codes of Bolivia,61 Nicaragua,62 Panama,63 Paraguay,64 
Puerto Rico,65 and Venezuela,66 as well as France,67 embrace essen-
tially the same approach. So does their Peruvian counterpart. The 
                                                                                                             
 61 See CD. CIV. (Bol.) (1976), art. 519 (“El contrato tiene fuerza de ley entre 
las partes contratantes. No puede ser disuelto sino por consentimiento muto o por 
las causas autorizadas por la ley.”) (“A contract has the force of law among the 
contracting parties. It may not be dissolved except by mutual consent or as au-
thorized by law.”); art. 526 (“Es válida la estipulación en favor de un tercero, 
cuando el estipulante, actuando en nombre propio, tiene un interés lícito en ha-
cerla.”) (“An agreement in favor of a third party is valid when the promisee, acting 
in his own name, has a legitimate interest in entering into it.”). 
 62 See CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 1836 (“Las obligaciones que nacen de los 
contratos, tienen fuerza de ley entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse al 
tenor de los mismos.”) (“The obligations arising from a contract have the force of 
law among the contracting parties and shall be complied with in accordance with 
the contractual text.”); art. 1875 (“Si en la obligación se hubiere estipulado alguna 
ventaja a favor de un tercero, éste podrá exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación, 
si la hubiere aceptado y hécholo saber al obligado antes de ser revocada.”) (“If an 
obligation contains an agreement to benefit a third party, the latter may enforce 
the obligation if he has accepted it and informed the obligated party prior to its 
revocation.”). 
 63 See CD. CIV. (Pan.) (1961), art. 976 (“Las obligaciones que nacen de los 
contratos tienen fuerza de ley 
entre las partes contratantes, y deben cumplirse al tenor de los mismos.”) (“The 
obligations arising from a contract have the force of law among the contracting 
parties and shall be complied with in accordance with the contractual text.”); art. 
1108 (“Si el contrato contuviere alguna estipulación en favor de un tercero, éste 
podrá exigir su cumplimiento, siempre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al 
obligado antes de que haya sido aquella revocada.”) (“If the contract contains an 
agreement in favor of a third party, the latter may enforce the former as long as 
he informs the obligated party that he has accepted it prior to its revocation.”). 
 64 See CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 717 (“Los contratos no pueden oponerse a 
terceros ni ser invocados por ellos, salvo los casos previstos en la ley.”) (“Con-
tracts do not bind and may not be invoked by third parties, except as provided by 
law.”); art. 732 (“El que obrando en su propio nombre estipule una obligación a 
favor de un tercero, tiene el derecho de exigir su ejecución en provecho de ese 
tercero.”) (“Whoever, acting in his own name, agrees to an obligation in favor of 
a third party has the right to enforce it.”). 
 65 See CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1939), art. 1209 (“Los contratos sólo producen efecto 
entre las partes que los otorgan y sus herederos . . . .Si el contrato contuviere al-
guna estipulación en favor de un tercero, éste podrá exigir su cumplimiento, siem-
pre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al obligado antes de que haya sido 
aquélla revocada.”) (“Contracts produce effects only among the contracting par-
ties and their heirs . . . . If the contract contains an agreement in favor of a third 
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latter embeds in its section on “Contracts in General,” among its 
“General Provisions,” Article 1363: “Contracts produce effects only 
among the parties that executed them . . . .”68 Of course, it does not 
thus preclude the enforcement of a contract legitimately intended to 
deviate from the standard enunciated. After all, Article 1353 already 
declares the whole “section’s general rules” inoperative if “incom-
patible with the specific rules applicable to” the contract in ques-
tion.69 Indeed, Aníbal Torres Vásquez explains that the “rule articu-
lated [in Article 1363] allows many exceptions, in which the con-
                                                                                                             
party, the latter may enforce the former as long as he informs the obligated party 
that he has accepted it prior to its revocation.”). 
 66 See CD. CIV. (Venez.) (1982), art. 1166 (“Los contratos no tienen efecto 
sino entre las partes contratantes: no dañan ni aprovechan a los terceros, excepto 
en los casos establecidos por la Ley.”) (“Contracts produce no effects except 
among the contracting parties. They may neither burden nor benefit third parties, 
except as provided by law.”); art. 1164 (“Se puede estipular en nombre propio en 
provecho de un tercero cuando se tiene un interés personal, material o moral, en 
el cumplimiento de la obligación . . . .Salvo convención en contrario, por efecto 
de la estipulación el tercero adquiere un derecho contra el promitente.”) (“One 
may enter into an agreement in one’s own name for the benefit of a third party 
based on one’s own personal, material, or moral interest in the fulfillment of the 
obligation. . . . .Unless otherwise stipulated, the third party acquires a right 
against the promisor by virtue of the agreement.”). 
 67 See CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 1165 (“Les conventions n’ont d’effet 
qu’entre les parties contractantes; elles ne nuisent point au tiers, et elles ne lui 
profitent que dans le cas prévu par l’article 1121.”) (“Contracts have no effect 
except among the contracting parties. They may not burden a third party; nor ben-
efit him except as provided under Article 1121.); art. 1121 (“On peut pareillement 
stipuler au profit d’un tiers lorsque telle est la condition d’une stipulation que l’on 
fait pour soi-même ou d’une donation que l’on fait à un autre.”) (“Similarly, one 
may contract in favor of a third party, as in a condition to an agreement that one 
undertakes for oneself or as in a donation that one makes for someone else.”). 
 68 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1363 (“Los contratos sólo producen efectos 
entre las partes que los otorgan . . . .”). 
 69 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1353 (“Todos los contratos de derecho pri-
vado . . . quedan sometidos a las reglas generales contenidas en esta sección, salvo 
en cuanto resulten incompatibles con las reglas particulares de cada contrato.”) 
(“Every private law contract is subject to this section’s general rules, except if 
they are incompatible with the specific rules applicable to it.”). 
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tract may produce effects favorable or unfavorable to third par-
ties.”70 He mentions, as one example among many, “liability insur-
ance policies for harm caused by automobile drivers, physicians, 
etc., establishing that the insurance company will indemnify any 
victims (third parties to the insurance contract).”71 
More broadly, two parties may, under the express authorization 
of Article 1457, enter into a “contract for the benefit of a third 
party,” with one of them committing before the other one “to do 
something for the benefit of a third party.”72 Article 1458, in turn, 
echoes the law in Argentina,73 Nicaragua,74 and Paraguay,75 when it 
proclaims that: “The right of the third party arises directly and im-
mediately upon the execution of the contract.” 76 Furthermore, the 
same provision stresses that the third party renders “the right . . . en-
forceable” by telling the parties at any moment that he intends “to 
                                                                                                             
 70 Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 2 (“esta regla presenta muchas excep-
ciones por las que el contrato puede producir efectos favorables o desfavorables 
para terceros.”). 
 71 Id. at 34 (“Los seguros de responsabilidad civil por daños causados por 
conductores de vehículos, médicos, etc., que establecen que la compañía asegura-
dora debe indemnizar a las víctimas (terceros ajenos al contrato de seguro).”) 
 72 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1457 (“Por el contrato en favor de tercero, el 
promitente se obliga frente al estipulante a cumplir una prestación en beneficio de 
tercera persona.”). Aníbal Torres Vásquez lists “[t]he contract in favor of a third 
party” as an exception to the relativity principle. (“El contrato celebrado en favor 
de tercero.”) Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 11. 
 73 See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 1027 (quoted supra, note 60). 
 74 See CD. CIV. (Nicar.) (1904), art. 2492 (“Después de la aceptación del ter-
cero, el prometiente está obligado directamente para con él, a ejecutar su promesa, 
y el derecho del tercero queda asegurado con las mismas garantías que el estipu-
lante pactó.”) (“With his acceptance, the third party imposes a direct obligation to 
keep the promise in his favor on the promisor. He thereby secures the same guar-
anties as agreed with the promisee.”) 
 75 See CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 730 (“ . . . las relaciones entre el estipu-
lante y el tercero serán juzgadas como si el contrato se hubiere ajustado directa-
mente entre ellos.”) (“ . . . The relationship between the promisee and the third 
party will be adjudicated as if the two had directly entered the contract with each 
other.”). 
 76 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1458 (“El derecho del tercero surge directa e 
inmediatamente de la celebración del contrato.”). See Torres Vásquez, supra note 
57, at 16 (“El Derecho del tercero surge directamente del contrato, sin necesidad 
que preste su aceptación.”) (“The third party’s right derives directly from the con-
tract, independently of his acceptance.”). See also id. at 46, 50, 50-51, 60. 
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exercise that right.”77 Finally, Article 1461, captioned “Enforceabil-
ity of the Promisor’s Compliance,” reiterates that “the right to de-
mand the promisor’s compliance with the obligation . . . belongs to 
the third party beneficiary once he has made the declaration referred 
to in Article 1458 . . . .”78 “Since the law does not specify the mat-
ter,” Torres Vásquez elucidates, “the acceptance of the benefit may 
take place either expressly or tacitly . . . .”79 
Significantly, Article 1354, which equally appears in the section 
on “Contracts in General” as one of the “General Provisions,” an-
nounces that: “The parties may freely determine the contract’s con-
tent, so long as it does not run counter to a mandatory legal norm.”80 
Explicitly denominated a “contract” in its codified definition,81 a 
                                                                                                             
 77 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1458 (“Empero, será necesario que el tercero 
haga conocer al estipulante y al promitente su voluntad de hacer uso de ese dere-
cho, para que sea exigible, operando esta declaración retroactivamente.”). See To-
rres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 43 (“Una vez que el tercero hace conocer al esti-
pulante y al promitente su voluntad de hacer uso del derecho establecido en su 
favor (art. 1458), tiene a su disposición todos los medios compulsivos que corres-
ponden al acreedor contra el deudor (art. 1219).”) (“Once the third party informs 
the promisee and the promissor that he intends to exercise the right established in 
his favor (art. 1458), he has at his disposal all of the creditor’s means of coercion 
against the debtor (art. 1219).”); id. at 16 (“Pero para que este derecho sea exigi-
ble, sí es necesario que [el tercero] haga conocer a los contratantes su aceptación 
de aprovechar la estipulación en su favor.”) (“Nonetheless, the enforceability of 
the right necessitates that [the third party] inform the contracting parties of his 
acceptance of the agreement in his favor.”) . See also id. at 49, 50, 55. 
 78 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1461 (“Exigibilidad de cumplimiento al pro-
mitente: El . . . derecho a exigir el cumplimiento de la obligación por el promi-
tente . . . corresponde al tercero beneficiario una vez que haya efectuado la decla-
ración a que se refiere el artículo 1458 . . . .”). 
 79 Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 44-45 (“Al no existir forma preestable-
cida por la ley, la aceptación del beneficio puede hacerse en forma expresa o tácita 
(art. 141) . . . .”). 
 80 CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), 1354 (“Las partes pueden determinar libremente el 
contenido del contrato, siempre que no sea contrario a norma legal de carácter 
imperativo.”). 
 81 See CD. CIV. (Peru) (1984), art. 1457 (“contrato”). See also Torres Vás-
quez, supra note 57, at 36 (“Es un contrato. Con la figura del contrato a favor de 
tercero se hace referencia al tipo de contrato con el cual se crea un beneficio o 
favor económico para terceros.”) (It is a contract. Third party contracts produce 
an economic benefit or advantage for a third party.”). 
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third party agreement falls squarely under Article 1354,82 as well as 
under the previously analyzed precepts on contractual exegesis. 
Therefore, individuals may set up such a scheme and structure it, to 
a large extent, as they wish. 
By the same token, the parties do not have to rely on a particular 
formulation, much less inscribe the instrument with the phrase “third 
party contract.” They solely have to intend to grant the third party 
the entitlement or the advantage at stake. Once again, an adjudicator 
may discern such intent from the face of the ultimately undersigned 
document or from the underlying circumstances. 
In a nutshell, ordinary interpretation principles, which privilege 
the parties’ intent, apply when determining whom the contract ben-
efits or entitles and how or to what exactly. The Civil Code in Peru 
and elsewhere in the civil law realm authorizes third party agree-
ments, exempting them from the fallback principle that restricts con-
tractual effects to the contracting parties. The third party attains his 
or her right directly and immediately upon execution of the relevant 
instrument and may vindicate it by notifying the parties, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, at any time. Freedom of contract, as well as 
the statutory sanction, empowers people both to enter into such an 
arrangement and to configure it, to a considerable degree, as they 
see fit. 
D. Recapitulation 
First, Latin American law, as part of its civil law heritage, usu-
ally requires reading a contract on the basis of the parties’ common 
intention. It commands enforcing the latter, when plainly demon-
strable, even if at odds with the ultimately undersigned document. 
Along parallel lines, the Peruvian legal system necessitates disre-
garding the contractual wording upon proof of a contrary intent. 
Throughout the region, courts must interpret a contract to mean A if 
they ascertain that the parties intended this meaning. They must do 
                                                                                                             
 82 See Torres Vásquez, supra note 57, at 37, 41 (“En el Derecho peruano no 
hay nada que prohíba [el contrato a favor de tercero], puesto que las partes son 
libres de determinar el contenido del contrato, siempre que no sea contrario a nor-
mas imperativas (art. 1354), al orden público y a las buenas costumbres.”) (“Noth-
ing in Peruvian law prohibits third party contracts, inasmuch as the parties may 
freely define the contract’s content, as long as it does not run counter to a manda-
tory legal norm (Art. 1354), the public order, or good morals.”). 
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so whether the text says A or B and, of course, when it allows either 
interpretation. 
Secondly, these exegetical principles, which privilege the par-
ties’ intent, apply when determining whom the contract benefits or 
entitles and how or to what exactly. The Civil Code in Peru and else-
where in the civil law realm authorizes third party agreements, ex-
empting them from the default norm that restricts contractual effects 
to the contracting parties. The third party acquires a right directly 
and immediately upon execution of the relevant instrument and may 
vindicate it by notifying the parties, whether explicitly or implicitly, 
at any time. Freedom of contract, as well as the statutory sanction, 
empowers people both to enter into such an arrangement and to con-
figure it, to a considerable degree, as they see fit. 
V. RETROACTIVITY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ECUADOR AND 
LATIN AMERICA 
A. For Starters 
Mostly, the civil law proscribes applying enactments retroac-
tively and awarding punitive damages. It does so somewhat differ-
ently from one country to the next. Nevertheless, these prohibitions 
operate relatively uniformly throughout. 
B. Retroactive Application of Laws: Point and Counterpoint 
The bar on retroactivity plays a central role in Latin American 
civil law. It prohibits the retroactive application of legislation. Ac-
cordingly, courts may not rely on an enactment passed after the facts 
of the complaint occurred. 
The Ecuadorian Civil Code, like many others in the civil law 
universe, proclaims that laws “shall have no retroactive effect.”83 It 
                                                                                                             
 83 See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (1970), art. 7 (“no 
tiene efecto retroactivo”). See also CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Chile) 
(1857), art. 2; CD. CIV. (D.R.) (1826), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7; CD. 
CIV. (El Salv.) (1859), art. 9; CD. CIV. (Fr.) (1804), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Hond.) 
(1906), art. 7; CD. CIV. FED. (Mex.) (1928), art. 5; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 2; 
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 3; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Venez.) 
(1982), art. 3. Sometimes, Latin American constitutions, like their U.S. counter-
part, embody the same restriction. See, e.g., CONST. (Mex) (1917), art. 14. 
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thus disallows reliance on a statute in order to challenge conduct that 
took place earlier. Defendants thus receive protection against having 
to face liability based on norms that did not hold when they under-
took the challenged actions. 
Nonetheless, Rule 20(a) of Article 7 carves out a unique excep-
tion. It declares, in essence, that purely procedural legislation may 
become valid immediately.84 The provision reads: “Laws that con-
cern the substantiation and the solemnities of lawsuits shall prevail 
over prior laws from the moment in which they enter into effect.”85 
Article 163(2) of Ecuador’s Organic Judicial Code contains almost 
identical language.86 
Of course, a judge may not merely state that an enactment 
amounts to procedure, rather than substance, in order to apply it. Nor 
may she focus on its adjective to the exclusion of its substantive 
components to the same end. If the judiciary had the authority to 
label, at will, any statute as purely procedural for purposes of retro-
active application, it could end up hollowing out the ban on ex post 
facto laws. Tribunals must, therefore, rationally and restrictively 
construe the exemption for legislation that exclusively regards pro-
cedure. They must examine the invoked enactment in its entirety 
before classifying it as strictly formal and deploying it retroactively. 
A complex, concrete controversy in which a complainant rests 
her claim for damages on a newly enacted statute may help illustrate 
the intricacies of the issue. For instance, she may file a genuinely 
collective or diffuse action under an environmental law, such as Ec-
uador’s Environmental Management Act,87 or an equivalent enact-
ment elsewhere in the region.88 Article 43 of the Ecuadorian statute 
                                                                                                             
 84 See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7(20(a)); CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (1970), art. 
7(20a). 
 85 Id. (“Las leyes concernientes a la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios, 
prevalecen sobre las anteriores desde el momento en que deban comenzar a re-
gir.”). 
 86 CD. ORG. JUD. (2009), art. 163(2) (“Sin embargo, las leyes concernientes a 
la sustanciación y ritualidad de los juicios, prevalecen sobre las anteriores desde 
el momento en que deben comenzar a regir.”). 
 87 L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999). 
 88 See, e.g., CONST. (Braz.) (1988), art. 5(LXXIII) (“[A]ny citizen or party 
with standing [may] file a popular action seeking to annul . . . state action that 
impinges . . . upon the environment.”) (“[Q]ualquer cidadão e parte legítima 
[pode] propor ação popular que vise a anular ato lesivo . . . de entidade de que o 
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provides that “persons, legal entities, [and] groups of people united 
by a common interest and directly affected by the injurious action 
or omission may sue . . . for damages in relation to any sanitary or 
environmental harm.”89 It emphasizes that environmental rights are 
“collective” and “shared by the community” and explicates “diffuse 
interest[s],” somewhat confusingly, as “homogeneous and indivisi-
ble interests held by indeterminate groups of individuals tied by 
common circumstances.”90 
Consequently, the claimant would apparently be basing her suit 
on a substantively new enactment that profoundly alters the state of 
the law. When the contested conduct occurred, the legal system en-
titled her to seek compensation, under the Civil Code, when some-
one negligently or culpably injured her personally.91 Since then, it 
additionally empowers her to demand reparation for any generalized 
harm to the environment and to the community’s health. 
Diffuse claims differ radically from their individual counter-
parts. The former pertain, indivisibly, to society and are independent 
of any individual rights that citizens may hold. The latter belong to 
                                                                                                             
Estado participe, . . . ao meio ambiente.”); L. 24 (Pan.) (1995), art. 78 (“Any per-
son may file, under this law, an environmental public action . . . regarding not an 
individual or direct injury, but rather a threat or injury to diffuse interests or to the 
interests of a collectivity.”) (“En cumplimiento de la presente Ley, toda persona 
podrá interponer acción pública ambiental, sin necesidad de asunto previo cuando 
por su naturaleza no exista una lesión individual o directa, sino que atañe a los 
intereses difusos o a los intereses de la colectividad.”); L. 28237, CD. PROCESAL 
CONST. (Peru) (2004), art. 40 (“Likewise, any person may file for a writ of pro-
tection when a threat to or a violation of environmental or other diffuse rights that 
have constitutional stature is at stake . . . .”) (“Asimismo, puede interponer de-
manda de amparo cualquier persona cuando se trate de amenaza o violación del 
derecho al medio ambiente u otros derechos difusos que gocen de reconocimiento 
constitucional . . . .”). 
 89 L. 77, L. Gestión Ambiental (Ecuad.) (1999), art. 43 (“Las personas natu-
rales, jurídicas o grupos humanos, vinculados por un interés común y afectados 
directamente por la acción u omisión dañosa podrán interponer ante el Juez com-
petente, acciones por daños y perjuicios y por el deterioro causado a la salud o al 
medio ambiente incluyendo la biodiversidad con sus elementos constitutivos.”). 
 90 Id., Glosario de Definiciones (“Inter[eses] Difuso[s]”) (“intereses homogé-
neos y de naturaleza indivisible, cuyos titulares son grupos indeterminados de in-
dividuos ligados por circunstancias comunes.”). 
 91 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), arts. 2214, 2229. 
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particular individuals and involve matters that concern them person-
ally, rather than the collectivity.92 
For example, the community may have claims to a sound envi-
ronment that transcend those of any of the members. It may, accord-
ingly, demand redress for the contamination of a remote, uninhab-
ited, and inaccessible territory. A citizen who represents the collec-
tivity under these circumstances, assuming a traditionally govern-
mental function, seeks to vindicate an entirely different kind of en-
titlement than when she pursues compensation for the pollution of a 
piece of land that she owns. 
Hence, the suitor would be hard pressed to portray, with plausi-
bility, the transition from a regime of private entitlements to one of 
diffuse entitlements as purely procedural. In light of this difficulty, 
she could try a different strategy. First, she could acknowledge that 
the environmental legislation does touch upon substantive matters. 
Then, she could contend that, in a deeper sense, the statute simply 
empowers a new class of litigants to vindicate a long-established, 
formerly state-enforced entitlement and, as such, operates mostly 
procedurally. 
In proceeding down this path, however, the complaint starts by 
conceding that the relevant provisions of the environmental law do 
bear upon substance. Hence, it renders irrelevant the question 
whether the statute might, from a more profound perspective, have 
an adjective character. After all, the Civil Code in Ecuador denies 
any retroactive effect whatsoever to substantive laws even if they 
partially regulate or constitute procedure. 
At the end of the day, the empowerment of citizens to exercise 
the diffuse entitlements, whose vindication was formerly the state’s 
prerogative, would seemingly entail, per se, a substantive change in 
the law. It would not only increase the number of potential lawsuits 
by a sizeable margin but also introduce a significantly different type 
of plaintiff. The corresponding incentives, requirements, and re-
strictions differ considerably when private parties, as opposed to the 
authorities, file the action. In comparison with the state, individuals 
and non-governmental entities may, inter alia, find more of a moti-
                                                                                                             
 92 See generally Ángel R. Oquendo, Justice for All: Certifying Global Class 
Actions, WASHINGTON U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. (2016) (forthcoming), 
IV(E)(3). 
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vation in the prospect of a substantial monetary reward, need to dis-
close less about the suit under freedom-of-information or other prin-
ciples, and confront fewer due-process limitations when interacting 
with their opponent in court. 
An enactment that thus accords citizens standing to enforce the 
community’s diffuse rights would seem not to qualify as just cere-
monial precisely because it brings about such a major alteration in 
the legal order. In the terms of the Civil Code, it would not appear 
simply to “concern the substantiation [or] the rituality of lawsuits.”93 
Ultimately, such a law, upon retroactive deployment, tends to im-
pose on potential defendants exactly the kind of extra burden that 
the bar on retroactivity aims to spare them. 
At this juncture, the complainant could attempt an alternative 
tack. Instead of purporting to categorize the ex post facto statute as 
procedural, she might assert that it basically boils down to a reen-
actment of already existing laws entitling individuals to sue. She 
might first zero in on Civil-Code provisions that institute the right 
to prosecute a suit in tort. 
For example, Article 2214 essentially declares that whoever 
harms someone else through an illicit act has an obligation to in-
demnify the injured party.94 Similarly, Article 2229 generally re-
quires people to repair any damage that they cause through malice 
or negligence.95 The claimant may argue that these provisions, 
which obviously have equivalents throughout the civil law uni-
verse,96 contain the substantive law upon which her action rests. She 
                                                                                                             
 93 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 7(20a) (“la sustanciación y ritualidad de los 
juicios”). 
 94 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2214 (“Whoever commits a criminal or neg-
ligent offense that injures someone else, bears an obligation to indemnify, without 
prejudice to the legally imposed punishment for the offense.”) (“El que ha come-
tido un delito o cuasidelito que ha inferido daño a otro, está obligado a la indem-
nización; sin perjuicio de la pena que le impongan las leyes por el delito o cuasi-
delito.”). 
 95 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2229 (“As a general rule, a person shall re-
pair any harm attributable to his or her malice or negligence.”) (“Por regla general 
todo daño que pueda imputarse a malicia o negligencia de otra persona debe ser 
reparado por ésta.”). 
 96 See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Braz.) (2003), art. 927 (“Whoever harms another by an 
illicit act shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“Aquele que, por ato 
ilícito, causar dano a outrem, fica obrigado a repará-lo.”); CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857), 
art. 2329 (“As a general rule, a person shall repair any harm attributable to his or 
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may maintain that they may serve to address diffuse injuries to the 
society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation entails problematic conse-
quences. Articles 2214 and 2229 posit ordinary tort actions through 
which plaintiffs vindicate their own individual entitlements, rather 
than the community’s diffuse rights. The judiciary would be trans-
forming these provisions if it read an unprecedented diffuse-rights 
suit into them. In so doing, it would be acting against cardinal civil 
law tenets, which command strict adherence to the letter of the 
Code,97 as well as expressly condemn the retroactive application of 
laws.98 
At this point, the suitor might turn her attention to Article 2236 
of the Civil Code.99  She might note that this provision entitles any 
person to file a popular action in order to remove a contingent harm, 
even if the drafters had probably not anticipated the possibility of 
application to the case at hand. She may insist that legal institutions 
require updating and evolution and conclude that this popular action 
lies in environmental cases. 
Indeed, the Ecuadorian Civil Code, like many of its counterparts 
in the region, establishes a series of such private-law popular actions 
for the enforcement of diffuse rights under specific circum-
stances.100 Specifically, Article 2236, like its equivalents elsewhere, 
authorizes “a popular action in cases in which, because of some-
one’s imprudence or negligence, a contingent harm threatens an in-
determinate number of people.”101 It requires a precisely identified 
                                                                                                             
her malice or negligence.”) (“Por regla general todo daño que pueda imputarse a 
malicia o negligencia de otra persona, debe ser reparado por ésta.”); CD. CIV. (Fr.) 
(1804), art. 1382 (“Whoever culpably harms another shall bear an obligation to 
repair the harm.”) (“Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dom-
mage, oblige celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer. “); CD. CIV. (P.R.) 
(1930), art. 1802 (“Whoever harms another by a culpable or negligent act or omis-
sion shall bear an obligation to repair the harm.”) (“El que por acción u omisión 
causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, está obligado a reparar el 
daño causado.”). 
 97 See, e.g., CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18. 
 98 Id. art. 7. 
 99 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2236. See infra note 101 and accompanying 
text. 
 100 See Oquendo, supra note 92, IV(E)(3). 
 101 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2236 (“Por regla general se concede acción 
popular en todos los casos de daño contingente que por imprudencia o negligencia 
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contingent harm,102 in addition to contemplating only injunctive 
remedies for the purpose of removing the danger at stake.103 
The hypothesized complaint would presumably fail to meet 
these requirements. In particular, it does not allege the right kind of 
injury or pray for the right type of relief. As a result, the provision 
at stake would evidently not apply to the dispute at hand. 
Once again, one must appreciate the difficulty of reading a new 
and open-ended diffuse-rights action into Article 2236.  This con-
struction, like that of Articles 2214 and 2229 previously analyzed, 
would expand the scope of the provision at issue beyond recognition 
and run up against the civil law tradition’s interdiction of any judi-
cial deviation from precisely codified language and of retroactive 
application of laws. Furthermore, it would tend to render the other 
Civil-Code popular actions superfluous and ultimately to undercut 
the codifiers’ overall approach, which consists in setting up a series 
of tightly tailored diffuse actions, rather than a single far-reaching 
suit. 
At each turn, the adjudicator might feel tempted to play loose 
with the standard. She might have to remind herself that the latter 
                                                                                                             
de alguno amenace a personas indeterminadas.”). See also CD. CIV. (Chile) 
(1857), art. 2333; CD. CIV. (Colom.) (1887), art. 2359; CD. CIV. (El Salv.) (1859), 
art. 2084. 
 102 These actions have a preventive character. See, generally, José Luis Diez 
Schwerter & Verónica Pía Delgado Schneider, Algunas útiles herramientas olvi-
dadas en nuestra práctica del “derecho de daños,” 214 REV. DCHO. UNIV. 
CONCEPCIÓN 143, 144-148 (§ 2) (2003) (“Popular Preventive Actions”); Fran-
cisco de la Barra Gili, Responsabilidad extracontractual por daño ambiental: El 
problema de la legitimación activa, 29 REV. CHILENA DCHO. 367, 401-402 
(§ 2.5.3) (2002) (“inhibitory mechanism”; “purpose of preventing a contingent 
harm”); ARTURO ALESSANDRI, DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD EXTRACONTRACTUAL EN 
EL DERECHO CIVIL CHILENO 218 (III(3)) (1983). As such, they target the party who 
is in charge and, consequently, in a position to prevent the contingent harm. Some-
one who has no control cannot possibly avert that harm and therefore is not subject 
to suit. 
 103 The Article has “the purpose of preventing a contingent harm” and entitles 
plaintiffs “to appear before a judge so that he can issue an order to forestall [the 
contingent harm].” Barra Gili, supra note 102, at 401 (§ 2.5.3) (“para ocurrir ante 
el juez a fin de que ordene hacerlo desaparecer”); ALESSANDRI, supra note 102, 
at 218 (III(3)). “A possible or hypothetical harm, based on suppositions or con-
jectures, . . . does not give rise to a right to indemnification.” Id. at 218 (III(3)) 
(“Un daño eventual, hipotético, fundado en suposiciones o conjeturas, . . . no da 
derecho a indemnización.”). 
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embodies a key civic guaranty, which calls for rigorous implemen-
tation. Therefore, a tribunal should err on the side of preserving the 
proscription. 
In sum, Ecuador, as well as other nations in the civil law world, 
embraces a broad prohibition on retroactivity. It specifically ex-
empts adjective statutes. Nevertheless, judges normally should con-
strue this exemption narrowly in order to avoid undermining the ban 
or the underlying principles. 
C. Keeping Civil Punishment in Check 
All in all, punitive damages have no basis in Latin American or 
in Continental European law. Ecuador’s legal system, like its coun-
terparts in the civil law tradition, does not provide for such a remedy. 
Of course, scholars such as Argentine Ramón Daniel Pizarro pro-
pose opening up to punitive damages under limited circum-
stances.104 Still, Pizarro himself typically recognizes the unavaila-
bility of this type of relief in Latin America and Continental Eu-
rope.105 In addition, an adjudicator could probably not justify the 
imposition of punitive damages as an application of a principle of 
universal law. Finally, she would likely not be able legitimately to 
reinterpret such an award as involving moral damages because it 
would satisfy none of the requirements for that kind of compensa-
tion. 
Civil law courts ordinarily may not grant punitive damages. In 
order to disregard this ban on their own, they would have to set aside 
profoundly ingrained principles, such as those that establish that 
codified law strictly binds the judiciary. In fact, this restriction re-
tarded the transition from pecuniary to so-called moral or psycho-
logical damages. For a very long time, judges granted compensation 
for material and economic injuries, but not for pain and suffering. 
They felt that awarding the latter kind of redress, as opposed to the 
former, lacked support in the Civil Code and would enable them to 
exercise unbound and impermissible discretion. In some countries, 
                                                                                                             
 104 See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 112-120 and accompanying text. 
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this attitude changed only upon almost unanimous scholarly con-
demnation and upon an amendment to the Code, the Constitution, or 
both.106 
In order to award punitive damages in Latin America or in Con-
tinental Europe, a tribunal would also have to disregard the equally 
deep-seated conviction that a civil remedy may not operate as pun-
ishment. Actually, this widespread persuasion has hindered the de-
velopment of any significant support, either among scholars or 
among lawmakers, for the adoption of this kind of reparation. In ex-
ceptional cases, Latin American and Continental European jurisdic-
tions sanction not punitive damages generally, but rather relief that 
transcends compensation and that appears to have a punitive com-
ponent. The legal systems that take this approach do so, occasion-
ally, in areas like consumer-protection.107 In the relevant cases, they 
usually authorize the adjudicator to make the award under limited 
circumstances and under specific guidelines. She may not generally 
pass on the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct and assess a 
commensurate penalty, as with punitive damages in the United 
States. 
Some civil law tribunals, like the German Supreme Court, have 
even gone so far as to declare punitive damages inconsistent with 
the public order and to decline to execute foreign judgments that 
include such a remedy.108 The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice-
of-Court Agreements unambiguously authorizes such refusal: 
“Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused, if, and 
to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exem-
plary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual 
                                                                                                             
 106 See, generally, Miguel Reale, Moral Damages in Brazilian Law, in A 
PANORAMA OF BRAZILIAN LAW 121 (Jacob Dolinger & Keith Rosenn eds., 1992). 
 107 See, e.g., L. 24.240 (Consumer Defense Act) (Arg.) (1993), art. 52bis 
(“The judge may impose, at the request and in favor of the consumer, a civil fine, 
which will vary depending on the gravity of . . . the case, on providers who fail to 
meet their legal or contractual duties toward consumers . . . .The civil fine may 
not exceed” five (5) million pesos.). 
 108 See, e.g., BGHZ 118, 312 (343 f.) (Supr. Ct.) (Germany) (1992) (summa-
rized in Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American Money-Judg-
ments in Germany: The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 729, 730-31 (1992)). 
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loss or harm suffered.”109 Similarly, the European Union Regulation 
864/2007, on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 
allows member states to decline to apply statutes from other Euro-
pean-Union countries on the basis of “considerations of public in-
terest,” specifically when the law in question calls on the judiciary 
to “award . . . non-compensatory exemplary or punitive damages of 
an excessive nature.”110 
Nonetheless, commentators like Ramón Daniel Pizarro have en-
dorsed the incorporation of a punitive component in civil indemni-
fication under limited circumstances.111 Significantly, this author 
actually acknowledges the traditional stance and cautions that “pu-
nitive damages have not attained much recognition in the Continen-
tal European system or in Latin America.”112 He specifically notes 
that the punishment of “intentional torts” or of “gross negligence” 
faces “serious difficulties,” mostly due to “the lack of norms for the 
imposition of civil sanctions in such cases.”113 
Aiming to transcend a mere “description of the system,”114 how-
ever, Pizarro advocates the “future” 115 adoption, in Argentina, of 
                                                                                                             
 109 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 
I.L.M. 1294, art. 11(1). 
 110 Council Regulation 864/2007 (On the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations) (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L. 199/40) (EC), Consideration 32. 
 111 RAMÓN DANIEL PIZARRO, DERECHO DE DAÑOS 287-337 (Ch. XIII (“Daños 
Punitivos”)) (1996). 
 112 Id. at 295 (“Los daños punitivos no han alcanzado mayor repercusión den-
tro el sistema de Europa Continental ni en Latinoamérica.”). Elsewhere, Pizarro 
states that, “among us [in Argentina], as well as in most countries in Continental 
Europe and Latin America, [punitive damages] have not attained much recogni-
tion.” Id. at 287. He notes, in particular, that civil-law literature has attributed 
“little importance . . . to the punitive dimension of tort law.” Id. at 289. 
 113 Id. at 290 (“agravie intencionado”; “de una grosera negligencia”; “serias 
dificultades”; “la ausencia de normas que permiten sanciones civiles en tales su-
puestos). See also id. at 291 (“The problems relating to the punishment of certain 
torts” stem from “a glaring lack of adequate normative principles”) & 297 (“In 
Latin America . . . , punitive damages find few antecedents.”). 
 114 Id. at 288 (“descripción del sistema”). 
 115 Id. at 287 (“futura”). See also id. at 291 & 336. Pizarro asserts that “puni-
tive damages in the common law constitute one of the possible parameters for 
consideration in the formulation of future legislation.” Id. at 291. Nonetheless, he 
acknowledges that comparative efforts in the civil-law tradition usually restrict 
themselves “to Continental European law and to the Latin American system” and 
rarely focus on “the common law and its institutions.” Id. at 288. 
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this institution, as a “useful instrument,”116 under “exceptional and 
restricted” 117 circumstances. Not surprisingly, he addresses his pro-
posal to lawmakers and insists that it requires express legislation 
prior to application. He underscores, using his own italics, “the ab-
solute necessity of providing for such penalties by law.”118 “Punish-
ment,” he explains, “must be expressly established in the law in or-
der to forestall an encroachment upon basic notions of legal cer-
tainty that the Constitution consecrates.”119 At the end of the day, 
Pizarro is simply endorsing the kind of punitive relief that has al-
ready emerged in the civil law realm, not the wider-ranging variant 
that prevails in the United States. 
Of course, the Ecuadorian Civil Code’s Article 18(7a) estab-
lishes that, in the absence of a legal norm applicable to the contro-
versy at hand or to analogous cases, an adjudicator may turn to “the 
principles of universal law.”120 It thus echoes its counterparts all 
over Latin America and Continental Europe.121 All the same, this 
provision does not entitle judges to apply any imaginable rule to set-
tle the disputes before them. Instead, it creates a narrow exception, 
which should not undermine the judiciary’s overriding obligation to 
adjudicate, strictly, according to what the Code spells out and ex-
plicitly commands. 
Consequently, a tribunal must, in applying Article 18(7a) or its 
equivalents throughout the civil law universe, first show that no le-
gal norm exists for the case or for any similar controversy. Since the 
Civil Code governs civil lawsuits, it does not leave a vacuum of this 
                                                                                                             
   116     Id. at 287. 
 117 Id. at 336 (“excepcional”; “restrictiva”). 
 118 Id. at 336 (“la necesidad indispensable de consagrar tales puniciones por 
ley.”). 
 119 Id. at 290 (“las penas deben estar expresamente provistas por la ley, so 
riesgo do afectar elementales principios de seguridad jurídica que consagra la 
Constitución nacional.”) 
 120 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 18(7a) (“A falta de ley, se aplicarán las que 
existan sobre casos análogos; y no habiéndolas, se ocurrirá a los principios del 
derecho universal.”). 
 121 See CD. CIV. (Arg.) (2016), art. 2; CD. CIV. (Chile) (1857, art. 24; CD. CIV. 
(Colom.) (1873), art. 32; CD. CIV. (C.R.) (1886), art. 11; CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), 
art. 18(6a & 7a); CD. CIV. (Hond.) (1906), art. 20; CD. CIV. FED. (Mex.) (1928), 
arts. 18 & 19; CD. CIV. (Para.) (1985), art. 6; CD. CIV. (Peru) (1930), art. VIII; 
CD. CIV. (P.R.) (1930), art. 7; CD. CIV. (Uru.) (1868), art. 16; CD. CIV. (Venez.) 
(1982), art. 4. 
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sort. In fact, it covers all kinds of tort claims, including those per-
taining to injuries alleged to have occurred due to “serious culpabil-
ity, serious negligence, extreme culpability,” or even due to “malice 
(dolo), which consists in the positive intention to visit harm upon 
someone else or upon his or her property.”122 
In addition, the Code provides for a wide array of remedies, such 
as indemnification,123 reparation,124 and even moral compensa-
tion.125 In a typical fashion, it does not authorize punitive damages 
under any circumstances. In any event, inasmuch as courts have at 
their disposal positive law to address questions of liability and relief, 
Article 18(7a) does not apply. 
Even in the absence of relevant legal parameters, a judge seeking 
to rely on Article 18(7a) must, additionally, point to a pertinent prin-
ciple of universal law. As just noted, Latin American and Continen-
tal European systems universally reject the notion that the judiciary 
may punish defendants in controversies under the Civil Code. In 
fact, the remedy in question appears to find clear support only in the 
United States and in a few other common-law jurisdictions.126 
Therefore, no principle with the necessary degree of universality 
would sustain an award of punitive damages. If anything, the general 
                                                                                                             
 122 CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 29 (“Culpa grave, negligencia grave, culpa 
lata”) (“El dolo consiste en la intención positiva de irrogar injuria a la persona o 
propiedad de otro.”). 
 123 Id. arts. 2214-2216. 
 124 Id. art. 2229. 
 125 Id. arts. 2231-2234. 
 126 The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed the constitutional validity of puni-
tive damages, while imposing strict due-process limitations. See, e.g., Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 
U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 
(2003); BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Cf. Honda 
Canada Inc. v. Keays, 2008 SCC 39, [2008] 2 SCR 362 (Sup. Ct.) (Canada) (“Pu-
nitive damages are restricted to advertent wrongful acts that are so malicious and 
outrageous that they are deserving of punishment on their own . . . .Courts should 
only resort to punitive damages in exceptional cases . . . .); Rookes v. Barnard, 
1964 A.C. 1129, 1225-28 (H.L.) (England) (1964) (L. Devlin) (An award of “pu-
nitive or exemplary damages” may lie (1) when “oppressive, arbitrary or uncon-
stitutional action by the servants of the government” has taken place; (2) when 
“the defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself 
which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff”; or (3) when 
“exemplary damages are expressly [authorized] by statute.”). 
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practice throughout the world points in the opposite direction, 
namely, in that of a proscription of this kind of relief. 
Finally, one may not persuasively assimilate punitive to moral 
damages. The latter, as previously pointed out, address mainly psy-
chological and reputational injuries and, as opposed to the former, 
do not aim at punishment, but rather at compensation. They require 
that the plaintiff specifically request for such relief,127 as well as that 
the adjudicator assess and justify the sum awarded.128 A condemna-
tion of a defendant to pay a penalty on grounds of allegedly repre-
hensible conduct would not seem to qualify as an award of moral 
damages. 
D. Wrap-Up 
The civil law of Ecuador, like that of other countries in Latin 
America and Central Europe, forbids the retroactive application of 
laws and the imposition of punitive damages. These prohibitions 
play an important role in the legal system and call for strict adher-
ence. In this area, the civil law tradition evinces an impressive 
amount of congruence despite the variance in the details. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Parts II and III meditated upon, respectively, the notion of the 
civil law tradition and that of codification. Thereafter, Part IV inves-
tigated the mostly common take on contractual interpretation and on 
third-party agreements. Finally, Part V scrutinized the characteristic 
proscriptions against retroactivity and punitive damages. 
All in all, this article has reflected upon certain institutions, as 
well as ideas, that inhabit the civil law universe. It has shown how 
they have survived and developed in Latin America. In fact, this le-
gal realm as a whole reveals its true internationalized and modern-
ized face as it goes through this story of survival, development, and 
even transformation. It possesses no common essence and shows it-
self as one simply by virtue of a family resemblance among the sys-
tems belonging to it. Hence, each one of the latter shares with the 
                                                                                                             
 127 See CD. CIV. (Ecuad.) (2005), art. 2233. 
 128 See id. art. 279. 
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rest not a single element, but rather a number thereof, discontinu-
ously and incompletely: in other words, an overarching, variegated 
and somewhat nebulous history and culture. 
